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1.Introduction 
Some of the most important environmental problems urgently calling for solution are 
problems related to transboundary pollution. Environmental problems such as ozone 
depletion, climate change and marine pollution have been the focus of intense 
negotiations at the international level over the past decade. International 
environmental agreements have been reached in some areas, such as the Montreal 
Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer and a number of agreements on 
marine pollution (e.g. the International Conference on  Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-Based Sources, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter). I n some 
other areas there is still an ongoing process of negotiations, such as the current 
negotiations following the UN Conferences on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro and Kyoto. Although there  are a great number of international agreements, 
these agreements are characterized either by generality and vagueness in defining 
targets or by small number of signatories when precise targets are set. It is easy for 
countries to sign general statements expressing interest and willingness to improve 
their environmental behavior but it is extremely difficult to commit at achieving 
particular targets. The long and painful negotiations on the climate change problem 
also provide evidence of the difficulties associated with achieving large, stable and 
substantial international environmental agreements. 
The formation and development of international environmental agreements 
has been the subject of a fast growing branch of the economic literature over the past 
decade, which though originates in the 1960s and 1970s. Recognizing the existing 
interdependencies between countries’ choices, which lead to the observed strategic 
positioning of countries involved in negotiations of environmental agreements, a great 
part of this literature uses game theory as the tool of analysis. T he purpose of the 
present work is to provide a critical review of this part of the literature on 
international environmental agreements. Our goal is to provide a systematic account 
of the issues examined, rather than an exhaustive presentation of the literature. 
From the point of view of economic theory, environmental problems 
constitute one form of market failure  –due to the absence of well defined property 
rights and markets-- and for that, some type of government intervention is needed for 
their resolution. Contrary to local environmental problems which can be addressed by   2
existing governmental bodies, at the international level there is luck of a supra-
national authority that could implement and enforce environmental policies on 
sovereign states. Thus, i nternational agreements have to be designed so that they are 
self-enforcing. 
There are two important design issues that self-enforcing international 
environmental agreements have to address. The first is that in order to be acceptable 
by a large number of  countries the agreements have to be profitable to all countries. 
The profitability to all members of a coalition cannot be taken for granted especially 
when high asymmetry in both costs and benefits from reducing pollution exists among 
countries. Thus, in  designing the agreement some type of profitability condition for all 
members has to be imposed. 
Assuming that the agreement is designed to be profitable and countries have 
an incentive to join in, they also have incentives to cheat on the agreement ex-post. 
That is, countries have an incentive to forfeit their obligations of reducing their 
emissions so that they minimize their costs at the same time that they enjoy the 
benefits of lower emissions achieved by the rest of the countries. For some countries, 
the free-riding incentives may be large, undermining the stability of the coalition. 
Therefore, some type of stability constraint has to be incorporated into the design of 
the agreements so that they become stable. 
  The main body of the literature agrees that the number of signatories of self-
enforcing, profitable and stable coalitions is very limited. Regardless of the degree of 
asymmetry among countries, there exist strong free-riding incentives that restrict the 
number of participants. This result seems to be robust both within a static and, what is  
more surprising, within a dynamic framework. However, it has been shown that the 
size of a stable coalition could increase substantially when the model is expanded in 
the following directions: (i) to account for non-material aspects in countries’ benefits 
from joining the coalition; (ii) to account for interdependencies in countries’ cost and 
benefit functions; and (iii) to allow countries to anticipate other countries’ reactions to 
their choices instead of acting myopically. 
  Given that a stable, self-enforcing agreement will be signed by only few 
countries, which have an incentive to increase the number of participants, the natural 
next step is to consider ways in which the initial coalition can be expanded. The 
literature has identified two different types of instruments that can be used in 
expanding a coalition, namely direct transfers and issue linkages. A set of transfers   3
can be derived to induce cooperation by all countries, that is, to make the agreement 
profitable for all countries. However, if transfers are not supported by some sort of 
commitment by at least the core countries, the agreement is subject to free riding and 
thus, not stable. Therefore, some sort of credible commitment is necessary to support 
side payments in expanding a stable coalition. The necessary degree of commitment 
varies depending on the assumptions of the model that is used. 
  Alternatively, cooperation in environmental issues can be linked to other 
issues affecting the negotiating c ountries. Two main issue linkages are examined in 
the literature, trade sanctions and R&D cooperation. It is shown that issue linkage 
substantially increases the size of an environmental coalition. 
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The basic  framework for 
examining international environmental agreements is laid out in section 2. Section 3 
presents the benchmark cases used in the literature as well as a general description of 
the self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Section 4  presents the 
main developments in the literature organised along three issues: (i) determining the 
size of the coalition, (ii) expanding the coalition and (iii) the choice of policy 
instruments. Conclusions are given in the final section. 
 
2. The basic framework 
This section presents the basic elements of the analysis of international environmental 
agreements. Because of the resulting complexity of the analysis, specification of 
production and utility function is avoided except when absolutely necessary in 
addressing certain questions. The majority of works reviewed here use a social 
welfare defined in very general terms. A number of assumptions are employed 
regarding the welfare function, which we denote as model assumptions. In defining 
the form of the game, both the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches are used 
in the literature within static, repeated and dynamic frameworks.  
2.1 The objective function 
At the first level, the link between economic activity and the physical environment is 
established in order to generate an economic-ecological model. This link is 
established through a social welfare function that incorporates the environmental 
damage (which is subjectively evaluated) along with the utility from consumption,  
the profits from production (pollution is positively correlated with production) and the   4
costs from abatement. The social welfare function is defined either at the national or 
global level depending on the questions addressed. 
The welfare function can be formulated with respect to either the emissions or 
the abatement of emissions. When emissions are used, the welfare function equals the 
difference between benefits from and damage to the environment, that is, 
( ) ( ) ) 1 ( , 1 2 1 n ,x , i ,x , x
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where  xi denotes emissions associated with production in country  i, with  i=1,…,n, Bi 
denotes country  i’s benefits from the use of the environment for production and 
consumption activities at the international level, and  Di is country  i’s damage 
resulting from pollution in all countries. When instead the v ariable is abatement, the 
welfare function takes the form 
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where,  qi denotes abatement efforts in country  i, and  Ci  is the associated cost of 
abatement. 
The benefit function in (1) is analogous to the cost function in (2) and the 
benefit function in (2) to the damage function in (1). Thus, it is necessary that the term 
“benefit function” is always used in reference to the appropriate variable (emissions 
or abatement). 
A number of assumptions are made in the literature regarding the welfare 
function in order to simplify the analysis while maintaining the important features of 
the specific problem each paper studies. We refer to these assumptions as model 
assumptions, in order to distinguish them from the assumptions associated with the 
form of the game and which will be called game assumptions. 
The most important assumption concerns the form of interdependencies 
among countries. The benefits of country  i are primarily associated with domestic 
pollution, that is in most cases it is assumed that  ( ) i i x B . However, since we are 
concerned with international environmental problems, the damage each country 
suffers from pollution, or equivalently the benefit from abatement, is a function of all 
countries’ emissions.  
While each country’s environmental damage unambiguously depends on all 
countries’ emission, the same is not true for marginal damage. The degree to which 
other countries’ emissions affect country  i’s marginal environmental damage is very   5
important in determining the level of cooperation among countries. A number of 
papers assume separability of the damage functions. This assumption implies that 
every country’s marginal damage depends only on its own emissions and is 
independent of the emissions of all other countries, t hat is, the damage functions can 
be expressed as  ( ) ￿ =
n
i i i x f D
1
. There are some works however, that assume that 
countries’ marginal damage functions depend on other countries’ actions. As it will be 
discussed latter, the relaxation of the independence assumption is particularly 
important in defining the outcome of the game, and thus it affects the level of 
international cooperation.. 
  Another commonly used assumption is the symmetric country assumption. 
Although not realistic, assuming a common welfare function for all countries 
simplifies the exposition greatly. 
A number of works concentrate on cost-effective analysis ignoring the 
environmental damage. In this case the problem reduces to cost-minimization subject 
to an abatement constraint. This approach has the advantage of avoiding the 
specification of the damage function, which is highly subjective and also difficult to 
use because of the non-linearities it exhibits. The drawback of this approach is 
precisely the lack of a damage function, which  can reveal the incentives for 
cooperation as Barrett (1992a) points out. In the present paper we concentrate on 
works that employ welfare maximizing analysis. 
The social welfare functions in (1) and (2) are static and are concerned with 
the flow of emissions. However, the majority of environmental damages result from 
the accumulation (stock) rather than the flow of emissions. The very important 
international environmental problem of climatic change, caused by the anthropogenic 
emissions of the greenhouse gases  (carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, methane, 
nitrous oxides, and ozone) is  the primary  example of a stock externality. It is not the 
emissions of the greenhouse gases that cause the environmental damage, but  rather 
the accumulated stock of these gases in the atmosphere. 
In order to incorporate the notion of stock externality into the model, time is 
explicitly introduced. Environmental pollution becomes a dynamic process of 
accumulated emissions that dissolve slowly by natural processes (environment's 
assimilating capacity) which can be supplemented by abatement effort. Country  i’s   6
emissions  ( ) t xi  increase the stock of pollution over all countries  ( ) t S at time t. The 
concentration of pollutants damages the environment, and  ( ) ( ) t S Di  describes country 
i’s damage. Country  i’s benefits from production and consumption activities 
associated with the pollutant is described by  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t x t x t x B n i i , , , , 1 K K . The welfare 
function under stock pollution becomes, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ) 3 ( , , , , , e 1
0
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where r is the social discount rate.  
The policy maker in country  i is choosing the optimal path of emissions so as to 
maximize social welfare subject to the change of the accumulation of emission over 
time which is determined by the equation  
( ) ( ) ) 4 ( , 0 0 ‡ ” ￿ S =  S(0)  , S(t) - t x   = dt
t dS (t) S   i i d &  
where,  0 S  is the initial pollution level,  ( ) t xi  denotes country  i’s emissions per unit of 
time and d reflects the constant rate of pollution decay by natural processes.  
2.2 The nature of the game 
Due to the apparent interdependence in countries’ actions, in making its choices, each 
country takes into account other countries’ actions. Countries’ decision process can be 
modeled as either a cooperative or a non-cooperative game. When cooperation among 
countries is assumed, the focus is on the characteristic function of the coalition, that 
is, the objective is to maximize the total net benefits the coalition can share. On the 
contrary, when it is assumed that countries behave non-cooperatively, the objective is 
the maximization of each individual country’s welfare. The latter is arguably a more 
realistic assumption and for that reason it is the one most commonly used. 
Non-cooperative games can be formulated as (i) static games, (ii) repeated and 
(iii) dynamic games. Although only a small part of the literature is devoted to 
dynamic games, it is commonly accepted that dynamic games present a more realistic 
scenario. Furthermore, both repeated and dynamic games allow for the use of threats 
that may stabilize an agreement. 
i.  Static games (one shot games) 
The most commonly used framework is a two stage game. In the first stage, 
the coalition stage, every country decides independently whether to join the coalition 
or not. In the second stage, the emissions stage, each country chooses its emissions   7
level. The game is solved backwards, that is, the emissions stage is solved first 
followed by the coalition stage. Each country decides to join the coalition or not, fully 
anticipating the outcome of the related emissions game. (see for example Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993)).  
The main body of the literature examining the formation of international 
environmental agreements within a two stage game framework uses the following set 
of assumptions (as mentioned in Carraro and Siniscalco (1998)).  
1.  Decisions are simultaneous in both stages. 
2.  Countries are presented with a single agreement.  
3.  When defecting from a coalition, a country assumes that all other countries remain 
to the coalition. 
4.  The payoff  function of each country increases monotonically with respect to the 
size of the coalition. 
The first assumption excludes the possibility that one of the countries has any 
advantage in the game. The second assumption excludes the formation of more than 
one coalition. Relaxing this assumption leads to the formation of more than one 
coalition even in the case of symmetric countries (see Carraro and Siniscalco (1998)). 
The third assumption, consistent with Nash conjectures, excludes the possibility of 
farsightedness. Relaxing this assumption yields a different equilibrium, which we 
discuss briefly below. Finally, the fourth assumption is a model and not a game 
assumption. If we allow the payoff to be decreasing in the number of signatories after 
a number of countries sign the agreement, the optimal number of signatories may be 
less than the maximum stable coalition number.  
Alternatively, when the expansion of coalitions is examined the game can be 
reduced to a one-stage game using a partition function that replaces the emission 
game (see for example Carraro and Moriconi (1997)). The partition function assigns 
to each coalition structure a vector representing the worth of all coalitions within this 
structure. Thus, countries decide whether to join an already existing coalition 
knowing all possible payoffs. In this case, in addition to the above-mentioned 
assumptions, three more assumptions are required. 
5.  The Nash emissions game has a unique equilibrium for every coalition structure. 
6.  Within the coalition players play cooperatively while the coalition and single 
countries compete in a non cooperative way among them.   8
Assumptions 5 and 6 are crucial in defining the partition function, while another 
assumption is also used to simplify derivation of the partition function by introducing 
an equal sharing rule among coalition members. 
7.  All countries are identical, that is, they have the same strategy space in the 
emission game (Carraro and Moriconi (1997)). 
Games with coalitional equilibrium 
Although most of the literature develops around the above mentioned 
assumptions, there is a set of papers that work within a considerably different 
framework. The basic three assumptions are dropped. Countries do not decide 
simultaneously, allowing for deviations until the (permanent) equilibrium is reached. 
However, this is not formulated as a repeated game since countries realize payoffs 
only at the equilibrium. Countries are not presented with a single agreement, since 
many different coalitions can emerge (this is a more realistic assumption). And 
finally, when a country or a coalition deviates, it does not assume that all other 
countries or coalitions will retain the same policy. 
Within this framework Ecchia and Mariotti (1998) examine self-enforcing 
International Environmental Agreements based on the notion of coalitional 
equilibrium (see also Mariotti (1997)). For any coalition S, a coalitional strategy for S 
specifies the proposal of coalition S at any possible status quo. A coalitional 
equilibrium has the following properties: 1. For  an equilibrium strategy profile, no 
coalition wants to deviate from it. 2. No coalition should be able to gain by switching 
to an alternative coalitional strategy, at any status quo (Nash and sub-game perfect 
equilibrium requirement). 3. Deviations from the current status quo should be 
motivated, and 4. At the equilibrium point, no player can be forced to a worst payoff 
When a coalitional equilibrium is reached, then we have a self-enforcing IEA. 
This framework captures the notion of “farsightedness” which  might be a more 
realistic environment. Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) and Carraro and Moriconi(1997) 
consider this kind of changes and analyze the consequences of principals like 
“coalition unanimity” and “rational conjectures” within the framework of one s hot 
non-cooperative games. The assumption of rational conjectures is very close to the 
notion of farsightedness. 
ii.  Repeated games 
In reality the decision to join or leave an agreement can be reassessed at 
different points in time, in light of new facts and the knowledge of other players’ past   9
behavior. Assumptions 1 and 3 are relaxed, while assumptions 2 and 4 are usually 
kept. The main advantage of repeated games is that they can incorporate credible 
threats, and thus, increase greatly the potential for a cooperative solution. The treats 
are formulated in terms of abatement, that is, the observant countries threaten to 
return to the non-cooperation stage when one country is detected to cheat on the 
agreement. The treat could take various forms. It could be a trigger strategy turning to 
non-cooperation forever after one country cheats. The severity of the trigger strategy 
though often renders it non credible. Or it could be a tit-for-tat strategy that implies 
non cooperation only for one period. Because the credibility of punishments under the 
tit-for-tat strategy, these strategies  –or modifications of these strategies— have been 
more often considered in the literature (see for example Barrett (1994) and Heal 
(1994)).  
Dynamic games 
Although repeated games are closer to reality, they assume that the parameters 
of the game remain the same over time. However, pollutants accumulate over time, 
and thus, the damage to the environment is changing over time. Technology and other 
parameters of cost and damage functions a re changing over time too. Thus, the most 
appropriate framework to captures these facts is a dynamic game framework. It is 
based on the dynamic welfare function presented above and assumes a repeated 
negotiation process. 
 
3. Basic notions 
This section discusses the basic notions of the game-theoretic approach to analyzing 
international environmental agreements. The outcomes of different strategies 
available to countries are compared to the following benchmark cases. At the one end 
lies the full cooperation  equilibrium while a the other end there is the business as 
usual scenario or the Nash equilibrium. The most commonly used definition of self-
enforcing agreements is also presented.  
 3.1 The benchmarks 
Full cooperation 
There are some cases, which can serve as reference points when we discuss the 
possible equilibria for international environmental agreements. At the upper end lies 
the full-cooperation solution requiring the maximization of aggregate welfare, 
presented as the sum of all counties’ welfare. This is the efficient solution, at which,   10
marginal cost across countries are set equal to the aggregate marginal damage, that is, 
i MAC MD
n
i i i " = ￿ = , 1 , where  i MD  and  i MAC  denote marginal damage from 
emissions and marginal abatement cost for country i respectively.  
This solution could be reached in the presence of an international authority 
that has the necessary information to derive and the power to enforce the efficient 
allocation of abatement efforts. However, no s uch authority exists at present, and it is 
not realistic to assume that countries would relegate such power to an international 
body in the future. Alternatively, countries could voluntarily negotiate for and 
participate to a cooperative agreement. However, there are two main problems 
making the achievement of full cooperation very difficult if not impossible. The first 
is that, at the full cooperation equilibrium some countries may be worse off compared 
to the non-cooperation case. This problem could be sidestepped with the use of the 
appropriate transfers to countries that are loosing from cooperation. Since total gains 
from full-cooperation exceed aggregate losses, countries that realize the gains could 
certainly compensate the loosing countries. The second problem is that even if all 
countries gain from full cooperation, they have an incentive to free ride on the 
agreement. A county that decides to cheat by decreasing its abatement efforts lowers 
its cost while realizing the benefit of lower aggregate emissions achieved by the rest 
of the participants to the agreement. Although all countries could be better off at the 
full-cooperation solution, none will choose to cooperate given the existing incentives, 
at least within the static framework. 
Although not r ealistic, the full cooperation solution is used often as a 
benchmark case, depicting the first-best world, against which other possible solutions 
are compared. Alternatively, the Pareto-dominant solution is used as the benchmark 
case. This solution is derived by maximizing aggregate welfare subject to the 
condition that no country is worse off when it cooperates. Although it presents a more 
realistic scenario, it is also subject to free riding problems and furthermore, it does not 
lead to first best since it is a constrained problem.  
Best reply functions 
Two types of free riding behavior could be considered depending on the 
assumptions regarding countries’ best reply functions. The best reply functions 
present one country’s optimal level of emissions as a f unction of the other countries’ 
emissions. They reflect one country’s marginal emission damage, as determined by   11
other countries’ emissions. The best reply functions are orthogonal when the 
emissions of a country do not affect the marginal benefits of other countries 
(independence assumption). In this case, countries outside the coalition benefit from 
the reduction in emissions achieved by the cooperating countries but they cannot 
affect the benefits derived by the members of the coalition. Conversely, when 
interdependency between countries’ emission strategies is assumed, the best reply 
functions are negatively sloped. That is, a country will reduce its emissions in 
response to an increase in other countries’ emissions, and this reduction will be 
greater the higher is the elasticity of its best reply function and vice versa. In this case, 
free riding countries not only enjoy the benefits from the coalition but they can also 
hurt the stability of the coalition. This is because a decrease of emissions by the 
cooperating countries will be offset by an increase of emissions by the non-
cooperating countries. In such case some members of the coalition may lose and thus, 
decide to leave the coalition. Therefore, the assumption regarding the best reply 
functions is c rucial for the stability of partial agreements. The impact of different 
degrees of emission leakage, that is interdependencies in countries’ emission 
strategies, on the form and the size of the coalition is examined as well as proposals 
for limiting the leakage effects. 
Nash equilibrium 
At the lower end of possible equilibria for international environmental 
agreements lies the business as usual solution at which countries do not engage in 
abatement activities. This solution would be reached assuming that countries are 
ignorant of the damage caused by their own emissions (see Fankhauser and 
Kverndokk (1992)). When, however, countries realize this damage they have an 
incentive to reduce their emissions to some degree even in the absence of other 
countries’ action. Thus, the business as usual solution is far too extreme to even be 
used as a benchmark. The lower end could instead be depicted by the Nash 
equilibrium, which is derived assuming that every county chooses its abatement effort 
given the other countries’ choices. At the equilibrium each country sets its marginal 
abatement costs equal to its marginal pollution damage, that is,  i MC MD i i " = , . It is 
clear that the Nash equilibrium does not achieve either efficiency or cost 
minimization. The Nash e quilibrium is sometimes referred to as a “threat point”, that   12
is, as the default situation in case no agreement can be reached (see for example 
Folmer et al (1998)). 
3.2 Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements 
Because of free riding problems, neither the full cooperation nor the Pareto 
optimum solution can be considered equilibrium outcome. The literature has focused 
on identifying a sustainable equilibrium that will present an improvement over the 
Nash equilibrium. Such a solution must be self-enforcing since external enforcement 
is impossible. The vehicle of the analysis is non-cooperative game theory. The most 
important result shared by the main body of this literature is that coalitions are formed 
including only a fraction of the countries. The exact number of the countries in the 
coalition and the level of the abatement are determined by the particular assumptions 
of each model. 
In order for an international environmental agreement to be stable, there 
should be some mechanism rewarding entry and penalizing exit from the coalition. 
Such schemes have been proposed in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett 
(1994). According to them when a country joins the agreement the other signatories 
increase their abatement levels, rewarding the joining country. When a country 
defects, the opposite happens and the defecting country is punished. These 
punishments are credible because they result from the signatories’ welfare 
maximization problem. The problem is that the magnitude of the punishments is not 
always big enough to sustain an agreement with many countries. 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) present the following two conditions for 
achieving a self-enforcing agreement. The profitability condition requires that profits 
of every country belonging to  coalition  s  exceed its profits outside the coalition, that 
is  ( )
0
i i P s P > ,  s i˛ " , where ( ) s Pi  are country  i’s profits, when the coalition  s is 
formed, and 
0
i P  are country  i’s profits when the coalition has no members. There are 
two stability conditions. The internal stability requiring that no country wants to 
defect, that is,  ( ) ( ) s P s Q i i < -1 , where  ( ) 1 - s Qi are country  i’s profits when it defects 
from coalition  s. The external stability requiring that no other country wants to join 
the coalition, that is,  ( ) ( ) s Q j s P j j < + ,  j "  that does not belong to coalition  s, 
where ( ) j s Pj +  and  ( ) s Qj  are country  j’s profits when it joins in and when it remains 
outside coalition s respectively.   13
The intuition of the profitability condition is that no country will join the 
coalition if it does not gain, compared to the non-coalition case. This condition is 
fulfilled most of the times except when there are leakage effects, or great asymmetries 
across countries. The stability conditions are imposed to eliminate the free-riding 
incentives which are present even if a country gains from a coalition, since it may 
gain more by defecting, t hat is, by free riding on others’ abatement efforts. The 
internal stability condition ensures that if a country defects, the profits from free 
riding will be less than the profits if it stays in the coalition. This is achieved by 
reducing the non-defecting countries’ abatement level as a response to defection. 
Since this response results from the countries’ maximization problem it presents a 
credible threat.  
 
4. The main issues examined 
We present the main developments in the literature that examines the f ormation of 
international environmental agreements within a game theoretical framework by 
focusing on three main issues. The first is the size of stable coalitions, the second is 
the possibility of expanding stable coalitions and the means by which an expansion 
can be achieved, and the last concerns the choice of the policy instrument to be used 
by policy makers. 
4.1 Determining the size of a stable coalition 
Defining the number of signatories in international environmental agreements is the 
most important  task. Can there be a stable full coalition, the so-called “grand 
coalition”, or are the only stable international environmental agreements those with a 
small number of signatories? One strand of the literature based on cooperative game 
theoretic analysis s hows that the “grand stable coalition” exists (see Chander and 
Tulkens (1995), (1997), Tulkens (1998) and Uzawa (1997)). Another strand of the 
literature shows that, within a non-cooperative game theoretic framework, only small 
number coalitions are stable (see Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993)). 
Finally, support for the existence of a stable full coalition is provided within the 
framework of non-cooperative game theory, allowing for repeated games and 
assuming that countries are farsighted enough to understand the full consequences of 
free-riding behavior (see Ecchia and Mariotti (1998a and b)).  
Chander and Tulkens show that maximization of the characteristic function, 
that is, the aggregate welfare of all countries  --given in either equation ( 1) or (2)--,   14
can be achieved using an optimal set of transfers. The optimal transfer is written as 
function of country  i’s emissions at the optimum 
*
i x  and the Nash equilibrium  i x , that 
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* * , w here  ( ) i i x g  
denotes production in country  i as function of emissions, and  MWPE stands for the 
marginal willingness to pay for the environmental good (see Tulkens(1998)). Country 
i is compensated for any loss from participating in the grand coalition, and it takes in 
a proportion  n i MPWPE MWPE  of the total benefits achieved by the grand coalition. 
It is shown that once the grand coalition supported by the transfer scheme is reached, 
it cannot be improved upon by any sub-coalition,  that is, the grand coalition is both 
profitable and stable. The threat that sustains the grand coalition is the “Nash 
behavior” of all the remaining countries against the defecting countries and this is an 
individually rational threat (see Tulkens(1998)).  One issue that is not addressed  
though is the subgame perfection of this threat, which is crucial for its credibility. 
Another critical assumption of the above analysis is that countries are first presented 
with the option of the grand coalition, that is, there is no discussion of the process by 
which the grand coalition is formed. It appears that the existence of an international 
institution that designs and proposes the transfer scheme to individual countries is 
assumed.  
Within a different framework and contrary to the above result, Barrett (1994) 
shows that only small number coalitions are stable. His analysis is based on the notion 
of self-enforcing agreements using non-cooperative game theory. The following 
assumptions are employed: countries are identical (symmetry assumption); cost 
functions are independent of other countries’ emissions (independence assumption); 
there is full information regarding benefit functions; and abatement levels are 
observable. It is further assumed that signatories maximize their collective welfare, 
while the non-signatories behave individually, taking all other players’ actions as 
given. In defining the number of signatories at the self-enforcing equilibrium, the two 
stability conditions discussed above are imposed.  The self-enforcing international 
environmental agreements are examined both within static and infinitely repeated 
game framework. 
Within the static framework, and using simulations on particular cost and 
benefit functions, Barrett shows that the number of signatories depends on the ratio of 
the slopes of marginal cost and benefit functions. When this ratio is large, the self-  15
enforcing coalition has only few members and vise versa. However, when the number 
of signatories is large, the total benefits from cooperation are small. Thus, when the 
benefits from cooperation are potentially large the number of signatories of a self-
enforcing coalition is small, and thus, the potential benefits are never realized. The 
result that only few countries will be joining a stable c oalition is quite robust since it 
is reaffirmed in a variety of specifications by Hoel (1991), Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1993) and Botteon and Carraro (1998). Similar results are derived when the 
assumption of symmetric countries is dropped. Barrett (1993) s hows that even in this 
case, when stable coalitions are possible the benefits are small and vise versa. Botteon 
and Carraro (1998) also show that only a small number of countries form a stable 
coalition in the absence of transfers and that these countries  are the ones that suffer 
the higher environmental damage. 
What is more surprising is that similar results derive even when international 
environmental agreements are examined as repeated games. Allowing for infinitely 
repeated games and using a small interest rate one would expect that the increase of 
credible penalties would lead to increases in the number of signatories. However, 
following Farrell and Maskin (1989) in defining renegotiation-proof agreements and 
using specific cost and benefit functions, B arrett proves that there is an upper limit to 
the number of countries that can sustain the full cooperative outcome. This limit is 
high only when the difference in global net benefits between the non-cooperative and 
the full cooperative outcomes is small.  When this difference is large only few 
countries can sustain the full cooperative outcome.  
These results are similar to those derived within the static framework, 
verifying the disappointing result. Although the particular number of the signatories 
of a s elf-enforcing agreement depends on the functional form of the welfare function, 
the main result remains the same. Barrett sites the Montreal Protocol as an example 
supporting his findings. Although the participation in the Montreal Protocol is large 
(around 140 countries), the net benefits to individual countries are small.  
Finus and Rundshagen (1998) examine the stability of the grand coalition in 
relation to two different instrumental choices, the uniform emission reduction quota 
and the uniform effluent tax. While we defer the discussion of the comparison of the 
two instruments for section 4.3., we present their findings regarding the stability of  
international environmental agreements. They assume asymmetric countries and use 
cost-benefit analysis first within a static and then within a dynamic framework. They   16
assume that negotiations have the Nash equilibrium as a starting point and that the 
Lowest Common Denominator rule is used. This means that the prevailing proposal is 
the lowest abatement proposal, making sure that every country signs the agreement. 
These proposals are the outcome of welfare maximization for every country. They 
find that regardless of the policy instrument used the grand coalition is unstable. They 
also test whether the stability problem can be solved if the game is repeated over time. 
Using an infinitely repeated game framework and the weakly renegotiation-proof 
conditions proposed by Farell and Maskin (1989),  they arrive at results similar to 
those derived by Barrett (1994), that is, whenever the potential gains from cooperation 
are large, there is a stability problem. The social optimum solution is only stable in a 
few cases (when the number of countries is small and the benefit-cost ratio is large), 
for which abatement targets are low. This result holds for small discount rates too. 
Hoel (1992) also agrees with this result showing, using numerical simulations, that 
very few countries will form a stable coalition. Furthermore,  Finus and Rundshagen 
find that sub-coalitions might be  more efficient than the grand coalition because of the 
asymmetries that countries have.  
Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1991) present the problem of international cooperation 
as a differential game, that is, countries choose their strategies at any point in time 
depending on the concentration of pollutants at that time. They use a differential 
model similar to the one described by equations (3) and (4) and they assume that 
countries are of equal size sharing the same fixed emission output ratio and the same 
damage function. They compare this case to the case that countries commit to a 
strategy at the beginning of the game. In the latter case, using optimal control 
techniques they show that the stock of pollutants is bigger under the non-cooperative 
open loop Nash equilibrium compared to the full cooperation outcome. Next they 
argue that it is more realistic to assume that countries do not decide once and for all, 
but change their decisions according to the current observation of the stock of 
pollutants. Under this assumption we have to use the feedback Nash or sub-game 
perfect Markov equilibrium concept. Applying this concept and using Bellman’s 
dynamic programming they find that the concentration of pollutants is higher relative 
to the open loop Nash outcome. 
The intuition is that, when a country observes an increase in the concentration 
of pollutants it assumes that the other countries will abate more and so underestimates 
the marginal damage to the environment and thus pollutes more. Ploeg and de Zeeuw   17
conclude that the unrealistic assumption that countries commit to abatement strategies 
at the beginning of the game, leads to substantial underestimation of the damage to 
the environment and thus, to the underestimation of the benefits from cooperation. 
The existence of a  large number of international environmental agreements 
and the great number of signatories in many of those, such as the Montreal Protocol, 
is the main motivation of the work by Jeppesen and Andersen (1998). To explain the 
large number of participants in  international environmental agreements they extent the 
model developed in Barrett (1994) to incorporate the idea of fairness. In so doing, 
they utilize Rabin’s (1993) analysis of embodying non-material aspects into players’ 
payoffs. In particular, they add to the total benefits derived by a non-participating 
country a loss function from not joining the coalition. The loss from not joining the 
agreement becomes larger the higher is the number of participating countries. Within 
this framework, the size of the coalition depends on the particular functional form of 
the loss function. It is shown that for some loss functions, previously stable coalitions 
collapse, while for other functional forms even full cooperation is possible. Thus, 
depending on the weight countries’ assign to the non-material loss of not participating 
in the coalition the stable coalition could be either small or large.  
  Crucial role for the existence of a partial coalition plays the slope of countries’ 
best reply functions reflecting the assumptions regarding the interdependencies 
among countries’ actions. If best reply functions are negatively sloped, then any 
decrease of emissions from the cooperating countries will be offset by an increase 
from those outside the agreement. These are the s o called “leakage effects” and 
reduce the strength of partial coalition. If on the other hand, best reply functions are 
orthogonal then the non-cooperating countries simply enjoy a better environment 
without offsetting the other countries’ effort.    
Heal (1994) shows that if the independence assumption is dropped or there are 
fixed abatement costs then countries could unlock from the prisoner’s dilemma 
situation, because there are increased incentives to cooperate. The analysis introduces 
the notion of minimum critical coalition to help define coalition stability. The 
minimum critical coalition without side payments is defined as the coalition in which 
the benefits to individual members are at least equal to costs. This is very similar to 
notion of profitable coalition discussed above. Allowing for side payments, countries 
with net benefits support net losers in order to widen the size of coalition.    18
Using the notion of minimum coalition and a simplifying two-country model, 
Heal shows that countries have greater incentives to join and remain in a coalition 
when the independence assumption is relaxed, that is, when costs and benefits of 
abatement in one country depend on other countries’ actions. Heal argues that this 
assumption is more realistic since first, a n increase in one country’s abatement affects 
the marginal net benefit from abatement in other countries and second, the marginal 
cost of abatement in one country decreases with the abatement activities of the other 
countries. These reinforcement effects l ead to higher level of abatement and limit the 
problem of free riding. Similar results derive in the presence of fixed abatement costs. 
The leakage effects and finding ways to suspend them is also the concern of 
Hoel (1994). He assumes that only a small number of countries participate in an 
international environmental agreement and thus, only a sub-group of countries is 
committed to cooperation. Using a general equilibrium model he examines ways to 
limit the leakage problem within a non-cooperative static g ame framework. He shows 
that in most cases a mix of demand and supply policies gives the better outcome. He 
also shows that the existence of transfers is in the interest of both cooperating and 
non-cooperating countries, through which the cooperating countries affect the 
consumption and production of carbon in the non-cooperating countries. 
Ecchia and Mariotti (1998a,b) motivated by the contradiction between the 
theoretic results showing that only small number agreements are self enforcing and 
the reality o f large number agreements, extend the basic idea of self-enforcing 
international environmental agreements. They identify two problems with the basic 
model of self-enforcing agreements. In the basic model, countries are assumed to 
behave myopically, that is they ignore other countries’ reaction when making their 
choices. If instead countries are farsighted, that is they can anticipate other countries’ 
reaction to their choices and incorporate them into their decisions, the logic of the two 
stability conditions is undermined. The second problem is that the basic model does 
not allow other coalitions to form. Allowing countries outside the coalition to act as 
groups with respect to the main coalition again undermines the use of the stability 
conditions.  
Ecchia and Mariotti redefine self-enforcing international environmental 
agreements incorporating these two elements into a static model that captures the 
necessary recursiveness of farsightedness. The notion  of the “coalitional strategy” is 
introduced, upon which rests the definition of “coalitional equilibrium” which is a   19
kind of subgame perfect equilibrium for coalitional strategies. Farsightedness is built 
into the model since any coalition is considering the full consequences of its moves by 
deriving expectations regarding the reaction of the other countries or coalitions. Using 
the simplifying case where only three countries are involved in the game, they 
identify four different versions of the game. In the strong and weak prisoner’s 
dilemma cases polluting i s the dominant strategy, but in the weak version there is 
some incentive to cooperate within sub-coalitions. In the strong and weak chicken 
game there is stronger incentive to cooperate relative to the prisoner’s dilemma cases.  
The analysis of these four  types of games shows that complete non-
cooperation is impossible, while full coalition is always a possibility. The intuition of 
this striking result  --especially for the strong prisoner’s dilemma case-- is that when 
farsightedness allows countries to recognize the credibility of the free-riding threats 
they choose to cooperate. It is the “balance of credible threats” that keeps the full 
coalition alive in all four cases. Thus, when the idea of farsightedness is injected into 
the model, the possibility of larger coalitions increases. 
Endres and Finus (1998) examine the stability of international environmental 
agreements by incorporating in the welfare function the environmental awareness as a 
factor of the total costs of emissions. Within the static game framework they show 
that total gains from cooperation rise with the level of each country’s awareness. On 
the contrary, the stability of the grand coalition decreases, since the gap between Nash 
equilibrium and the social optimum outcome increases for the countries with lower 
awareness. The latter result stands even for a small proportional increase in countries’ 
awareness. The stability of the coalition increases only for a “big enough” rise in 
environmental awareness for each of the participants.  
Next, they check for the validity of these results in a dynamic context. They 
use the infinite supergame framework and in order to simplify the analysis they 
assume symmetric countries with respect to environmental awareness. They restrict 
their attention only to subgame perfect strategies. They again find that when the 
awareness of one country increases, the instability of the grand coalition increases as 
well. Contrary to the results within the static framework, they show that a small 
proportional rise in each country’s awareness increases the stability of the coalition 
while the reverse holds for a “big enough” increase. The explanation is that a big 
increase in awareness decreases again the gap between Nash equilibrium and the 
social optimum outcome and so punishment for the defector (playing Nash) is less   20
severe. Taking the example of an agreement based on a uniform emission reduction 
quota they find similar results. The increase of environmental awareness in one 
country affects both the incentives to participate  in an agreement and the punishment 
for defection for the other countries. Those effects in general work in opposite 
directions and the “punishment effect” dominates the  “incentive” effect, in a way that 
the final outcome of an increase in awareness can be the increase of the instability of 
the agreement. 
Endres and Finus examine also the effects of unilateral abatement actions in 
the case of quota agreement. They distinguish four cases. In the first, the country 
takes the unilateral action after the agreement has been signed and the demand for 
unilateral action by the country’s citizens is raised after the signing of the agreement. 
In this case the country that takes the unilateral action looses but there is a total gain. 
The three other possible cases are  examined are: unilateral action after the agreement 
is signed but the demand was raised before; unilateral action before the signing of the 
agreement and when the country does not take unilateral action but the demand is 
raised before the signing of the agreement. In all the three cases the country examined 
suffers a welfare loss while there is a total loss too. This is because the rest of the 
countries sign a less demanding agreement knowing or anticipating (rightly or 
wrongly) the country’s unilateral action. Thus, Endres and Finus show that good 
intentions are not always enough and that they might even worsen the situation.  
Na and Shin (1998) introduce uncertainty about the environmental benefits 
and examine its effect on coalition formation. They assume that each country’s 
marginal benefit of aggregate abatement is a random variable with a known 
distribution. They use a three country model with separable benefit and cost functions 
and they examine the outcome of negotiations before nature reveals the real value of 
marginal benefit for every country (ex ante negotiations) and after this value is 
revealed (ex post).  
They show that ex ante negotiation lead to the formation of the stable grand 
coalition (always referring to their three country model). On the opposite, ex post 
negotiations do not lead to a stable grand coalition. Depending on the distribution of 
marginal benefit they can lead either to a partial coalition or to no coalition at all. The 
intuition for the superiority of ex ante negotiations is t hat when countries don’t know 
everything, they are closer to each other, but when they know what exactly they have 
to gain and loose, they have different interests that makes cooperation difficult.   21
Finally they mention a second advantage of ex ante negotiations, that is, time savings. 
Countries do not have to wait until nature reveals the value of marginal benefit and 
this can prevent irreversible damages to the environment. 
4.2 Expanding stable coalitions   
The main body of the literature reviewed above shows that only small coalitions are 
stable except if the model is extended to include other issues. The use of abatement 
reductions or increases to punish defecting countries or attract new countries has 
limited effect. Thus, the next step is to examine other measures for expanding the 
initial stable coalition. The measures that have been considered in the literature are 
used to either increase the participation incentives through transfers and linkages to 
other issues or decrease the gains from cheating on the agreement through penalties.  
Transfers and Commitment  
As discussed in the previous section, transfers can be used to increase 
participation in international environmental agreements. That discussion though was 
based on cooperative game theory that implicitly assumes the existence of a 
supranational authority that enforces the transfer scheme. In this section we review 
some other ways of modeling transfers and then we discuss ways in which countries 
or group of countries could make credible commitments.  
Chander and Tulkens (1992) propose a different way of modeling 
negotiations. Instead of directly computing the preferred optimum (which requires the 
complete knowledge of benefit and cost functions) and finding ways to achieve it, 
they propose a “gradual” procedure. By this procedure, at each stage of negotiations, 
only gradual improvements of the previous situation are to be decided, which are 
Pareto-improving and converge to a social optimum. In this way only the local 
properties of the above functions need to be known. They model this procedure 
specifying a system of differential equations, which provide in every round of 
negotiations the abatement level for each country for the next step. The only required 
data are counties’ marginal willingness to pay for environmental improvement and 
marginal cost of abatement, at each point in time. The repetition of this process can 
lead close to an optimum.  
In their model transfers are allowed. As they point out, they are not necessary 
for the optimality of the f inal outcome but for supporting individual rationality. They 
propose a distribution rule that is first proposed by Chander and Tulkens (1991). 
According to this rule each country is burdened by a proportion of total abatement   22
cost. This proportion equals t he country’s intensity of preferences for environmental 
quality relative to the intensity of total preferences.  
A weak point of this analysis, which is based in cooperative game theory, is 
the free-rider behavior that might occur by some countries and for which no solution 
is given inside this framework so far, as the authors mention. 
Botteon and Carraro (1998) examine the possibility of expanding an initially 
small coalition in the case of non-identical countries, their asymmetry defined on the 
basis of d ifferences in their marginal environmental damage. They focus on 
comparing the Nash bargaining rule with the Shapley rule on the basis of their ability 
to achieve the expansion of the coalition. Using simulations of a five country model, 
they show that self-financed transfers can expand the initial stable coalition under 
both burden sharing rules if some degree of commitment is present. Furthermore, they 
show that under the Shapley rule expansion is possible even without partial 
commitment. This is because  the Shapley rule distributes the gains more evenly, 
offering higher stability to any coalition. Using simulations they find that a coalition 
with transfers based on Shapley values Pareto-dominates a coalition based on Nash 
bargaining solution. 
Using cost-benefit analysis within a framework similar to the one used by 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Hoel and Schneider (1997) examine the effect that a 
system of side payments has on the countries’ incentives to cooperate. They assume 
symmetric countries (same production function and equal marginal environmental 
costs for every country) and they incorporate non-environmental costs for not signing 
an agreement, which differ from country to country. They find that in the absence of 
side payments and with the help of country specific non-environmental cost function 
the number of signatories is not very small. In the specific example they use the 
number of signatories is half of all countries. On a contrary, when side payments are 
used, fewer countries join the agreement and the influence of non-environmental costs 
is diminished. 
The existence of a large number of international environmental agreements 
and the great number of signatories in many of those, such as the Montreal Protocol, 
is the main motivation of the work by Jeppesen and Andersen (1998). Employing the 
exact same model developed in Barrett (1994) they identify two possible directions in 
which this model can be extended to allow for higher participation in international 
environmental agreements. First, they  assume that commitments by individual   23
countries or group of countries are credible, contrary to Barrett who strongly opposes 
the idea that such commitments can be credible. Allowing a group of countries to 
make credible commitments regarding their abatement implies that this group of 
countries assumes a leader’s role in forming the coalition. This leading role allows 
them to calculate potential aggregate benefits from enhancing the coalition, and 
devise side payments to countries that have a follower’s role in order to achieve the 
optimum participation. Simulating Barrett’s model under the assumption of credible 
commitments Jeppesen and Andersen show that a relatively small core of committed 
countries could expand the coalition substantially, achieving even  full coalition. 
Although very interesting, the idea of commitment suffers from the absence of any 
explanation of how the power of commitment develops. 
After proving that only a fraction of countries would cooperate in the first 
place forming a stable coalition, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) search for ways of 
expanding a stable coalition. They assume complete information, symmetric countries 
and that agreements are non-binding and use the profitability and stability conditions 
to define the stable coalition. The game has the usual two stage form, that is, countries 
choose first whether to cooperate or not and subsequently they choose their emission 
level.  Within this framework, they show that when there is no commitment to the 
cooperative strategy from the  countries belonging to the stable coalition, self-financed 
transfers cannot expand the initial coalition. Then, they examine four types of 
commitment that could lead to the expansion of the core coalition. The types of 
commitment examined are: stable coalition commitment (only the core countries 
commit), sequential commitment (every new member commits), full-cooperation 
minimum commitment (committing countries are enough to induce full cooperation), 
and external commitment (commitment from a subset of countries outside the core). 
They show that whenever any of these types of commitment exist, the cooperation 
decision does not lead to a prisoner’s dilemma situation. The actual number of 
countries that can be attracted to the core coalition depends on the type of 
commitment (for example, sequential commitment produces wider coalitions than 
stable coalition commitment) and on the slope of the best reply functions (the more 
negative the higher the incentive to cheat the coalition).  
Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) extend the argument of partial commitment 
developed by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) to the case of non-identical countries and 
asymmetric information. Assuming linear damage functions, separable for every   24
country (independence assumption), and the existence of a stable coalition able to 
commit to cooperation, they show that expansion of the initial coalition is possible 
with self-financed transfers. Countries with the higher marginal environmental 
damage form the initial coalition and try to expand it using welfare transfers to 
countries suffering lower damages. The stable expansion of the coalition is achieved 
if the number of the member to the initial coalition is large and/or their benefits are 
high relative to the disutility of the new members. The stability of the expanded 
coalition depends on the ability of the initial group of countries to monitor and 
enforce the agreement to the new members. In order to avoid the high costs associated 
with monitoring and enforcement, Petrakis and Xepapadeas propose  a mechanism for 
overcoming the moral hazard problem. This mechanism is based on inducing 
voluntary actions by the new members of the coalition that have a low cost of 
monitoring their emissions. This mechanism, which can be thought as an alternative 
to an  international authority, is effective in resolving the moral hazard problem and it 
has low administrative cost. 
Issue linkages 
As the above discussion reveals transfer payments can substantially enhance 
the size of a coalition. When direct transfer payments are not possible, participation to 
an environmental agreement can be linked to other issues in such ways as to increase 
the benefits from participation. Such issues include trade policy, research and 
development, international debt and development assistance. Although there is some 
work on linking environmental agreements to international debt (see for example 
Mohr and Thomas (1998)) most of the literature focuses on trade and R&D linkages. 
These two types of issue linkages are reviewed in what follows.   
Motivated by the fact that trade sanctions were the only enforcement 
mechanism for signing the Montreal protocol, Barrett (1997) uses a partial 
equilibrium model to examine the effectiveness of trade sanctions in signing an 
international environmental agreement. He considers trade only in goods that are 
linked to the environmental problem and models the game as a static one with four 
stages (similar to the two stages one). Using simulations, Barrett shows that the 
results for the environment are better when there are trade sanctions. 
The linkage of trade policy with the environment is the subject of Breton and 
Soubeyran (1998). They use a detailed micro model where production and 
consumption is explicitly examined and where the policy maker chooses the   25
technology standard  --the only available policy instrument--, that balances production 
efficiency and environmental protection. They also deviate from previous works in 
considering two different policy rules: social optimization and median voter policy. 
Within the autarky framework they show that the technological standard is more 
demanding under the median voter policy. When trade is examined, they show that 
there is a strong relation between trade policy and the environment, whenever the 
tradable good affects the environment. Assuming that countries are large enough to 
influence the terms of trade, they examine the role of tariff wars in environmental 
negotiations. They show that trade policy can sustain environmental cooperation only 
if it is subgame perfect, that is, the “good” environmental country can win a tariff war 
if it is needed.  
The expanding of small stable coalitions with the help of issue linkage is the 
purpose of  Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) article. The linkage that is studied is 
through R&D cooperation. Their model incorporates not only countries’ but also 
firms’ behavior. Firms are assumed to maximize their profit, while countries the sum 
of domestic firms’ profit, consumer surplus and environmental quality. Firms choose 
the level of their R&D expenditure and production given the demand and a cost 
function. Countries decide whether to join the international environmental agreement 
or not and subsequently the abatement level that will be imposed on the local firms. 
Thus, the game is played in three stages, the first two describing countries’ choices 
and the last one the choice of R&D and production by firms. 
It is assumed that the R&D spillovers for a cooperating country are bigger 
compared to the spillovers of a non-cooperating one, that is, R&D benefits is an 
excludable good. It is also assumed that firms from the cooperating countries have 
lower marginal costs than the other firms and that governments’ best reply functions 
are orthogonal. Another important assumption is that technological progress affects 
both the economic and the environmental features of production. 
They solve the game backwards and they use the usual profitability and 
stability conditions. Using simulations they show that linking the R&D with the 
environmental negotiation procedure leads to a great increase in the stability of the 
environmental cooperation. It can increase the number of signatories and the total 
welfare of the cooperating countries.  
Katsoulacos (1998) is also studying the same issue linkage, but in a different 
way. He argues that R&D cooperation is not an issue dealt with at the country level.   26
Instead, it is firms that cooperate and governments cannot stop them. Governments 
could promote domestic firms’ participation in research joint ventures using subsidies. 
Since markets cannot sustain the socially optimal level of R&D investments, countries 
could gain from subsidization of investments in research joint ventures. If a country 
does not gain from unilateral subsidization of these investments, then there is a space 
for joint efforts and an international agreement on R&D is both profitable and stable. 
If this agreement is linked with an environmental one, the latter becomes stable too in 
the case that the gains of defection from the environmental treaty are smaller 
compared to the gains from R&D cooperation.  
The above discussion indicates that expansion of the initial coalition is 
possible in a variety of ways, some of which can produce very satisfactory results. We 
now turn to the question regarding the instruments of environmental policy. 
4.3 Choice of policy instrument 
The choice of the policy instrument for implementing an international environmental 
agreement is crucial. Environmental policy instruments are usually classified as either 
market based, which includes emission taxes and tradeable emission permits, or 
command and control, such as technology standards and firm-specific emission 
quotas.  The economic literature favors the use of market based instruments because 
they can achieve both static and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency refers to 
minimization of total abatement costs which is achieved through efficient allocation 
of abatement effort among sources. Dynamic efficiency refers to technological 
improvement over time, which is achieved through t he provision of the necessary 
incentives. However, both static and dynamic efficiency arguments are undermined in 
a second best world, as for example in the presence of market imperfections.  
  Similar arguments carry to the discussion of international environmental 
problems. In the international context, it is crucial to consider the incentives that each 
policy instrument provides to countries for participating and complying with the 
agreement. Furthermore, considering linking environmental problems to other issues 
such as trade, R&D or international debt (Mohr (1995) examines the latter case using 
tradeable emission permits) the issue of choosing the policy instrument becomes a 
second best problem. In such cases careful design of the market based policy 
instruments is paramount.  
Finus and Rundshagen (1998) examine two different policy instruments, 
namely the uniform emission reduction quota and the uniform effluent tax. They use   27
the lowest common denominator rule briefly discussed in section 4.1. They show  that 
total welfare is higher compared to the Nash equilibrium under both policies. 
However, under the uniform quota policy the benefit cost ratio of emissions is higher 
relative to the tax policy. The advantage of the quota policy is that it burdens less the 
low environmental conscious countries, making their participation easier, compared to 
the tax regime. Thus, although the uniform tax policy would yield higher total welfare 
because of its cost effectiveness, the uniform quota policy dominates due to the lowest 
common denominator rule. Within an infinitely repeated game framework the show 
that in a second best world, the quota policy is preferred to the tax policy. They also 
find that inside sub-coalitions the tax regime is preferred by the signatories only when 
their number is small. For a large number of countries with heterogeneous interests 
they prove that the quota regime is preferred, because it provides a more even 
distribution of abatement burdens.  
Hoel (1992) uses the non-cooperative static game framework and assumes that 
countries have identical cost functions while their evaluation of abatement benefits 
differ, that is, they have different damage functions. Within a specific example he 
finds that when a uniform reduction in emissions is adopted, half of the countries that 
signed the constrained social optimum abatements won’t sign now because the 
profitability of the agreement is severely reduced for those countries. This leads to a 
reduction in total welfare and to an increase in emissions from  the cooperating 
countries. In the case that the cooperating countries will prefer the proposal of the 
median country, the situation is even worse and complete non-cooperation might be 
the final outcome. So he concludes that a uniform emission quota is not  the most 
efficient tool for achieving environmental targets. 
Hoel (1993) examines the need for harmonization of carbon taxes across 
countries inside an international environmental agreement. He identifies two 
important problems related to harmonization. Tax harmonization yields equalization 
of marginal, but not total, cost of emissions across countries and so the rich countries 
will have smaller total costs. Second, there is the choice of whether the international 
tax should be added or replace local taxes. Within a formal model Hoel shows that 
optimally, a uniform international tax should be added to existing taxes. However, the 
existing free riding incentives will lead countries to the reduction or elimination of 
local taxes and thus, to a uniform tax which is suboptimal. Thus, it might be 
appropriate although not optimal to establish a minimum uniform tax for all countries   28
and allow countries to decide whether they add to, or replace existing taxes. 
Alternatively, a uniform tax supplemented by some reimbursement rules administered 
by an international body could minimize costs of achieving a given reduction in 
emissions.  
Hoel also discusses the use of tradable emission permits mentioning the 
advantages of this system over a tax system, namely the simpler institutional 
arrangements, the ability to be introduced gradually and the direct achievement of an 
emission reduction. Under ideal conditions, both policy instruments can achieve the 
efficient allocation but give different allocation of costs between countries.  Thus, the 
reimbursement rules and the initial permit allocation might be based on distributional 
and not efficiency considerations.  
  The need to provide incentives for participation in international environmental 
agreements appears to favor the use  of uniform emission standards over more flexible 
and efficient policy instruments. Some efficiency gains could be recovered if the 
uniform emission standard policy allows for joint implementation, that is, to permit a 
number of countries to reach their abatement targets jointly if they agree to do so. The 
extent to which efficiency can be restored depends on the incentives to participate in 
joint implementation programs within the agreement. However, it should be noted 
that the participation to joint implementation programs would be limited, at least at 
the initial stages, otherwise a market based policy instrument would have been 
accepted in the first place. Thus, joint implementation can be considered as a 
supporting element paving the way towards more efficient policies.  
 
5. Conclusions  
The present paper reviewed the main developments in the literature that uses a game 
theoretic framework to analyze international environmental agreements. The main 
result of this literature is that only small coalitions c an be stable, which however 
could use a variety of policy instruments to expand and sustain broader coalitions. 
The full coalition could be sustained assuming cooperative behavior and the presence 
of a supranational authority. However, under the more realistic assumption of non-
cooperative strategic behavior and in the absence of a supranational authority, free-
riding incentives restrict the size of self-enforcing stable coalitions. Assuming that the 
members of these small coalitions can credibly commit to certain actions, they can use 
either their gains from cooperation or other policies (such as links to trade policy,   29
technology transfers and debt policy) to provide participation incentives to other 
countries.    
  The analysis of international environmental agreements within a game 
theoretic framework has been very fruitful. The incorporation of the profitability and 
stability conditions in non-cooperative strategic behavior and the use of transfer 
payments and issue linkages are some of the most important  contributions. However, 
there is a number of limitations of this analysis which have mainly to do with the 
restrictiveness of the assumptions, which we brought forward at the beginning of this 
review. We believe that future research can contribute substantially in this field either 
by incorporating more realistic assumptions to the existing framework or by detailing 
the political process of decision making. On the latter direction, future research could 
detail the decision making process at the country level (Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) 
give some ideas in this direction), and/or examine the implementation of the 
agreement within countries which is assumed as given in the reviewed literature.    
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